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John G. Browning 
Should Judges Have a Duty of Tech Competence? 
Abstract.  In an era in which lawyers are increasingly held to a higher 
standard of “tech competence” in their representation of clients, shouldn’t we 
similarly require judges to be conversant in relevant technology?  Using real-
world examples of judicial missteps with or refusal to use technology, and 
drawn from actual cases and judicial disciplinary proceedings, this Article argues 
that in today’s Digital Age, judicial technological competence is necessary.  At 
a time when courts themselves have proven vulnerable to cyberattacks, and 
when courts routinely tackle technology-related issues like data privacy and the 
admissibility of digital evidence, Luddite judges are relics that the future—not 
to mention the present—can ill afford. 
Author.  John G. Browning is a partner in the Plano, Texas office of Spencer 
Fane, LLP, where he handles a wide variety of civil litigation and appeals in 
state and federal courts.  He serves as Chair of the Computer & Technology 
Section of the State Bar of Texas, as an adjunct professor at SMU Dedman 
School of Law, and as a faculty member for the Texas Center for the Judiciary, 
the Federal Judicial Center, and the Appellate Judges Educational Institute.  A 
nationally recognized thought leader on technology and the law, John is the 
author of four books, forty law review articles, and hundreds of other articles.  
His works have been cited in over 350 law review articles, practice guides in 
eleven states, and by courts in California, Florida, Maryland, New York, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Puerto Rico.  John gratefully acknowledges the insights 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
During a conference of state supreme court chief justices, after hearing a 
discussion of how judges cannot be told what to do, a guest (counsel for a 
large corporation) is reported to have said, “I’ve listened to you people talk.  
I’ve got to tell you, you just don’t get it.  You don’t have a clue what’s going 
on out in this world today.”1  He then explained how slow, incremental 
changes would not stave off the exodus to alternative dispute resolution and 
arbitration “because the economy’s moving too fast, and you are moving 
too slow.”2 
Yet, despite this warning, judges across the country regularly exhibit 
ignorance of or unwillingness to educate themselves about the technologies 
around which modern life revolves.  And it’s not simply a matter of the 
 
1. An Interview with Thomas Zlaket, CT. REV., Fall 2000, at 4, 11. 
2. Id. 
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occasional snickering over a judge not understanding how texting or cloud 
storage works; court operations from docket management to courtrooms, 
themselves, are increasingly driven by technology, and, indeed, judges must 
frequently rule on issues implicating matters of technology.3  A judge’s role 
demands tech competence in a wide range of matters from overseeing 
technology used in courtroom presentations, ruling on discovery and 
evidentiary issues involving digital sources, to their ethical use of technology 
like social media.4  As the executive director of the Alaska Commission on
 Judicial Conduct observed in 2014, “[b]oth the effectiveness of an 
individual judge and the imperative to promote confidence in the judiciary 
require technological literacy.”5 
Judges themselves are aware of the problem of insufficient tech 
competence.  In 2019, technology vendor, Exterro, and Duke Law’s 
EDRM6 conducted a survey of federal judges, which showed that, while 
fifty-six percent agreed that lawyers’ tech competence in e-discovery matters 
was adequate, only thirty percent of those surveyed were satisfied with their 
own level of tech training or education.7  Seventy percent said federal judges 
should receive more training and education on e-discovery technology and 
practices, while an additional five percent called for “extensive increases” in 
such training.8 
 
3. See, e.g., Marla N. Greenstein, Judges Must Keep Up with Technology: It’s Not Just for Lawyers, 
JUDGES’ J., Fall 2014, at 40, 40 (“[J]udges increasingly are asked to issue search warrants for electronic 
data with changing privacy implications.”). 
4. John G. Browning & Don Willett, Rules of Engagement: Exploring Judicial Use of Social Media, 
79 TEX. B.J. 100, 101 (2016) (exploring how a judge’s misuse of technology can give “at least the 
appearance of a lack of impartiality” potentially resulting in overturned cases); Eric Goldman, Emojis 
and the Law, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2018) (determining the meaning of emojis is an area of 
technology which judges are actively navigating).  Additionally, although the COVID-19 global 
pandemic struck after the deadline for this Article and the Symposium at which it was presented, the 
rush by courts all over the country to conduct hearings and other proceedings via videoconferencing 
platforms, like Zoom, underscores the importance of tech competence in times of crisis.  On 
April 8, 2020, the Supreme Court of Texas made history when, for the first time, it held oral arguments 
via Zoom.  Amy Howe, Courtroom Access: Faced with a Pandemic, the Supreme Court Pivots, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Apr. 16, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/courtroom-access-faced-with-a-
pandemic-the-supreme-court-pivots/ [https://perma.cc/4CEJ-L6PR]. 
5. Greenstein, supra note 3, at 40. 
6. EDRM is the Electronic Discovery Reference Model, an organization that sets the standards 
for e-discovery practice.  ERDM, DUKE LAW CTR. JUD. STUD., https://web.law.duke.edu/judicial 
studies/edrm/ [https://perma.cc/849X-5P22]. 
7. 5th Annual Federal Judges Survey: E-Discovery Advice for Becoming a Better Attorney, EXTERRO 2, 14 
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.exterro.com/2019-judges-survey-ediscovery/ [https://perma.cc/Q7S2-
RHX6]. 
8. Id. at 14. 
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Recently, much has been written regarding the revision to Comment 8 of 
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, which states that lawyers 
have a responsibility to not only “keep abreast of changes in the law and its 
practice,” but also remain conversant in “the benefits and risks associated 
with relevant technology.”9  To date, thirty-eight states have adopted this 
language or a variation of it.10  Yet, while judges have their own model code 
of conduct, this code does not contain a counterpart duty of tech 
competence, and neither does any individual state’s judicial code of conduct. 
Perhaps the closest that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct comes to 
supporting such a duty can be found in two provisions.  A comment to 
Rule 2.5 broadly defines judicial competence as requiring not only legal 
knowledge, but also the “skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary to perform a judge’s responsibilities of judicial office.”11  In the 
Digital Age, this could encompass everything from an awareness of 
cybersecurity risks, such as ransomware and how court systems might be 
affected, to the competence needed to assess the quality of counsel’s 
Internet legal research12 and knowing how to ethically use social media in 
one’s professional and personal capacities.13  And in an age of escalating 
use of technology by bad actors for everything from revenge porn to 
cyberstalking, cyberbullying, and adopting false Internet personas, it has 
become critical for judges to have a working knowledge of the technology 
underlying such causes of action.14  As studies of the admissibility and 
evidentiary significance of emojis have demonstrated, means of 
 
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see, e.g., 
John G. Browning, The New Duty of Digital Competence: Being Ethical and Competent in the Age of Facebook 
and Twitter, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 183 (2019) (“[T]he California Bar made it clear that it requires 
attorneys who represent clients in litigation to either be competent in e-discovery or to get help from 
those who are competent.”). 
10. Robert Ambrogi, 38 States Have Adopted the Duty of Technology Competence, LAWSITES, 
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence [https://perma.cc/4XMJ-D8FD] (listing the states 
that have adopted a duty to remain competent in technology). 
11. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.5 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
12. See Cass v. 1410088 Ontario, Inc., [2018] O.J. No. 6148 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.) (QL) 
(questioning why CanLII was not used for legal research to keep costs down). 
13. See John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 487, 533 (2014) (“[A] judge’s misuse of social media can certainly violate canons of ethics and 
negatively impact public perception of the judiciary . . . .”); Browning & Willett, supra note 4, at 100 
(suggesting when more judges start to use social media, it “often translates to more judges using social 
media badly”). 
14. See Fredric I. Lederer, Judging in the Age of Technology, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2014, at 6, 8  
(“As technology permeates our lives, it also affects the types of cases that courts must resolve, the 
procedural and evidentiary law to be applied, and the court’s culture.”). 
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communicating online have led to a new language of sorts, one which judges 
are increasingly called upon to interpret.15 
II.    CAUTIONARY TALES 
A. Judge Michael Bitney 
The second provision in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is Rule 1.2, 
which mandates that a judge “shall act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 
judiciary.”16  Unfortunately, there is an abundance of examples of judges 
whose misuse of technology—or refusal to use it—tends to undermine 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Consider the recent case of Wisconsin Judge Michael Bitney, for 
example.  Judge Bitney was presiding over a family court matter in 2017, in 
which Angela Carroll filed a motion to modify a joint custody order and 
shared physical placement of her son on the grounds that the boy’s father, 
Timothy Miller, “had engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse against her.”17  
After the parties had submitted their written arguments, Judge Bitney 
accepted Carroll’s Facebook friend request.18  Not long after, Carroll 
“liked” eighteen of Judge Bitney’s Facebook posts and commented on two 
of them.19  None of these likes or comments related to the pending 
litigation, and Judge Bitney replied to neither Carroll’s comments nor 
“likes.”20  However, Carroll “liked” and shared various third-party posts, 
including one on domestic violence; this “activity could have appeared on 
[Judge Bitney’s] Facebook ‘newsfeed.’”21 
After Bitney issued a ruling granting Carroll’s motion to modify, Miller 
learned of the Facebook friendship between his ex and the judge.22  When 
Miller’s motion to reconsider the ruling was denied, he appealed the issue to 
 
15. See John G. Browning & Gwendolyn Seale, More Than Words: The Evidentiary Value of Emoji, 
FOR THE DEF., Oct. 2015, at 34, 35–36 (highlighting a United States District Court judge’s decision to 
allow emojis to be shown to the jury as “they are meant to be read”); Goldman, supra note 4, at 1230 
(“[E]mojis contribute to misunderstandings that will require judicial interpretation.”). 
16. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
17. Miller v. Carroll (In re Paternity of B.J.M.), 925 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 582–83. 
21. Id. at 583. 
22. See id. (“Miller confirmed the Facebook connection between Carroll and Judge Bitney.  He 
then moved the circuit court for reconsideration . . . .”). 
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the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.23  The appellate court vacated the ruling 
and, in what it acknowledged as a case of first impression, held that the 
establishment of an undisclosed Facebook connection between a judge and 
a litigant appearing in ongoing litigation before that judge “created a great 
risk of actual bias, resulting in the appearance of partiality.”24  Although 
declining to adopt a bright-line rule governing judicial use of social media, 
the court recognized that, while a Facebook friendship does not necessarily 
denote a more traditional friendship, the fact that the connection was not 
disclosed and that Carroll was a current litigant before Judge Bitney 
heightened the appearance of partiality.25  The court also concluded that 
Carroll’s “liking” and “sharing” of posts concerning domestic violence was 
a form of ex parte communication that held at least the possibility of 
affecting Judge Bitney’s decision-making.26 
B. Judge Edward Bearse 
Judge Bitney, sadly, is far from an isolated cautionary tale.  Judges around 
the country have found themselves facing recusal motions, disciplinary 
proceedings, or have been forced to resign from office due to their ethical 
lapses in judicial use of social media.27  For a number of these judges, a lack 
of understanding of the relevant technology and its functionality was at least 
partially to blame for the judge’s lapse in judgment. 
Consider, for example, Senior Judge Edward W. Bearse of Minnesota.  In 
November 2015, Judge Bearse was publicly reprimanded by the 
Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards for his Facebook posts about cases 
he was presiding over—including one that resulted in a vacated verdict.28  
Bearse (who had served on the bench for thirty-two years, retired in  
2006, and was sitting statewide by appointment) referred to 
Hennepin County District Court in one post as “a zoo.”29  In another, he 
 
23. See id. (“[Judge Bitney] concluded that ‘even given the timing of’ his and Carroll’s Facebook 
connection, the circumstances did not ‘rise to the level of objective bias . . . .’”). 
24. Id. at 582. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 587 (“[An] erosion of public confidence and appearance of impropriety occurred 
here.”). 
27. For a broader discussion, see generally Browning, supra note 13, at 489, which “examines 
both the positive aspects of judges participating in social media as well as the ethical pitfalls.” 
28. See generally In re Bearse, File No. 15-17 (Minn. Bd. Jud. Standards Nov. 20, 2015) (amended 
public reprimand) (providing multiple instances of Judge Bearse’s inappropriate actions resulting in the 
Board’s investigation and eventual public reprimand). 
29. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 9. 
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reflected on a case in which the defense counsel had to be taken away by an 
ambulance mid-trial, likely to result “in chaos because defendant has to hire 
a new lawyer who will most likely want to start over and a very vulnerable 
woman will have to spend another day on the witness stand . . . .”30 
During State v. Weaver, a sex trafficking trial, Bearse posted the following: 
Some things I guess will never change.  I just love doing the stress of jury 
trials.  In a Felony trial now State prosecuting a pimp.  Cases are always 
difficult because the women (as in this case also) will not cooperate.  We will 
see what the 12 citizens in the jury box do.31 
After a guilty verdict, the prosecutor discovered Bearse’s Facebook post 
and disclosed it to the defense counsel, who successfully moved for a new 
trial because of the prejudice implied by the post.32  In the disciplinary 
proceeding, Bearse explained that he was new to Facebook,33 was unaware 
of privacy settings, and did not realize his posts were publicly viewable.34  
The Board concluded that he had put his “personal communications 
preferences above his judicial responsibilities,” given at least the appearance 
of a lack of impartiality, and had engaged in “conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.”35 
C. Judge William Shubb 
Another cautionary tale about judicial use of social media almost made it 
to the United States Supreme Court.  The case of United States v. Sierra Pacific 
Industries, Inc.36 arose out of a two week wildfire in September 2007—
dubbed the “Moonlight Fire” due to its proximity to Moonlight Peak—that 
devastated nearly 46,000 acres of forest in northern California.37  The 
California Attorney General filed suit in August 2009 against 
Sierra Pacific Industries, blaming the lumber giant for the blaze.38  A federal 
 
30. Id. at ¶ 5. 
31. Id. at ¶ 3. 
32. Id. at ¶ 4. 
33. See id. (stating Bearse had been using Facebook to communicate with his grandchildren for 
only two years). 
34. In re Bearse, File No. 15-17 at 5 (Minn. Bd. Jud. Standards Nov. 20, 2015) (mem.). 
35. In re Bearse, File No. 15-17 at ¶ 12 (Minn. Bd. Jud. Standards Nov. 20, 2015) (amended 
public reprimand). 
36. United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2675 
(2018). 
37. Id. at 1163. 
38. Id. at 1163–64. 
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lawsuit paralleling the state court action was soon filed as well, and in 
July 2012, a settlement was reached by the parties to the federal court case, 
in which the defendants denied liability.39 
In February 2014, the state court lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice 
because the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case against any of the 
defendants.40  The state court judge also awarded sanctions against the 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel for extensive discovery abuses.41  Armed 
with these favorable rulings and the results of an independent investigation, 
Sierra Pacific moved to vacate the settlement, alleging “fraud on the 
court.”42  United States District Court Judge William B. Shubb denied that 
motion.43 
Sierra Pacific appealed, pointing out that on the same day of the ruling, 
the United States Attorney’s office for the Eastern District of California 
had posted several tweets about the outcome of the case.44  Judge Shubb 
followed the Eastern District of California on Twitter (@EDCAnews) “and 
had purportedly received tweets about the merits of the case.”45  According 
to Sierra Pacific’s lawyers, Judge Shubb “tweeted about the case from his 
then-public Twitter account (@Nostalgist1),” using the headline 
“Sierra Pacific still liable for Moonlight Fire damages,” and providing a link 
to an article concerning the case.46  Sierra Pacific’s lawyer underscored how 
not only was the tweet inaccurate, “it also increased the appearance of bias 
and ‘prejudice[d] Sierra Pacific’” in the then-pending state court appeal.47  
During the appeal of Judge Shubb’s ruling, federal prosecutors advised him 
that his Twitter usage had become an appellate issue, prompting 
Judge Shubb to change his account’s privacy settings to “protected,” 
allowing only authorized followers to see his tweets.48 
In July 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed Judge Shubb’s ruling denying the defendants’ motion to set aside 
 
39. Id. at 1164. 
40. Id. at 1165. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1165–66. 
43. Id. at 1166. 
44. Id. 
45. Browning & Willett, supra note 4, at 101. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Appellants’ Motion for Judicial Notice or, In the Alternative, Motion to Supplement the 
Record on Appeal; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of William R. Warne at 5, 
Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-15799). 
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the federal settlement.49  However, the court also took the opportunity to 
recognize the important issues raised by the trial judge’s use of social media, 
stating “this case is a cautionary tale about the possible pitfalls of judges 
engaging in social media activity relating to pending cases, and we reiterate 
the importance of maintaining the appearance of propriety both on and off 
the bench.”50 
With respect to Judge Shubb’s Twitter activities, the Ninth Circuit panel 
felt that they did not warrant his retroactive recusal for two reasons.  First, 
with Twitter’s status as a service used by news organizations, government 
officials, and others “as an official means of communication,” the mere fact 
of the federal judge “following” the federal prosecution’s Twitter account 
did not constitute evidence of the kind of personal relationship needed for 
recusal.51  Second, under the Ninth Circuit’s plain error standard of review, 
the mere tweeting of a title and link to a publicly available article about the 
case, without any commentary or other indicia of partiality, would not rise 
to the level of error by Judge Shubb in failing to recuse himself 
retroactively.52 
While the Ninth Circuit may have missed the opportunity for a teachable 
moment for judges venturing onto social media, and despite the 
United States Supreme Court ultimately denying the defendants’ petition 
for writ of certiorari, this case still serves as the cautionary tale to which the 
Ninth Circuit alluded.53  A more sophisticated, technologically proficient 
user would have realized the publicly accessible, non-private nature of his 
Twitter account—not to mention the numerous identifying features tying 
Judge Shubb to the account.54  Putting aside the troubling ethical issue of 
whether Judge Shubb’s Twitter activity violated Canon 255 and 
 
49. Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d at 1175–76. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 1174. 
52. Id. at 1175. 
53. See id. at 1176 n.17 (“In making this decision, we do not express any opinion as to the 
veracity of either party’s factual assertions, attempt to decide any of the underlying issues, or express 
any opinion as to the troubling issues discussed in the state court opinion.  Nor do we make any 
findings as to the alleged use of the judge’s Twitter account, which was an issue undeveloped in the 
district court.  Those questions must be resolved, if at all, in another forum.”). 
54. Appellants’ Reply in Support of Motion for Judicial Notice or, In the Alternative, Motion 
to Supplement the Record on Appeal at 5–8, Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 15-15799). 
55. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2 (Jud. Conf. 2019) (requiring 
judges to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities”). 
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Canon 3A(6)56 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, this entire 
situation could have been avoided if the judge had a greater degree of 
technological competence. 
Not everyone agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling or the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari.  The results of a 2015 online 
poll showed eighty-five percent of respondents agreed that “(1) the judge’s 
tweet was improper and (2) judges should not tweet about cases before 
them.”57  Further, in his article Judicial Ethics and the Internet (Revisited), retired 
Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr. argued that judicial competence necessarily 
encompasses an understanding of how new and emerging technologies 
impact a jurist’s ethical obligations.58  As Judge Dixon sagely observed: 
The technologies of the Internet are new and still developing, but our 
principles of fairness are well established. . . .  Any appearance of partiality 
resulting from a judge’s conduct on the Internet or any social media platform 
toward or against any party is a result our justice system cannot tolerate.59 
There are, sadly, many other examples of judicial misuse of social media, 
ranging from judges disciplined for impermissibly endorsing a political 
candidate through “likes” and posts; posting controversial content on social 
networking platforms; to questionable Facebook “friendships” and ex parte 
communications online.60  However, to the extent that they stem not from 
a lack of tech competence but from ethical lapses are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
D. Judge Bruce Scolton 
While misusing technology can undermine public confidence in the 
impartiality of the judiciary, refusal to use technology can undermine 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.  In December 2018, 
Judge Bruce Scolton resigned his position as court justice for the town of 
Harmony, New York—a position he had held for twenty-eight years—and 
 
56. Id. Canon 3A(6) (“A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter 
pending or impending in any court.”). 
57. Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Judicial Ethics and the Internet (Revisited), JUDGES’ J., Fall 2018, at 37, 38. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (2013) 
(discussing judicial participation in electronic social networking). 
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“agreed to never seek judicial office again.”61  The reason?  According to a 
complaint filed with the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 
Judge Scolton “did not use his court email account for more than three 
years[,] . . .  had not activated or used a computer provided to him by a grant 
from the Office of Court Administration[,] . . .  [and] had failed to install 
certain court-related software on the computer,” rendering the 
Harmony Town Court unable to receive electronically-filed traffic 
citations.62  In a news release from the Commission, it noted that 
Judge Scolton had “failed to make timely reports and deposits of court 
funds to the State Comptroller,” and to give notice to the Department of 
Motor Vehicles regarding deficient drivers.63  The release went on to note 
that “public confidence” required local justices like Scolton “to account 
scrupulously for, and timely remit, all fines” owed to make “prompt and 
accurate reports of dispositions, so that a judge in a later case, for example, 
may properly adjudicate and fine a repeat traffic offender.”64  Judge Scolton 
had been using paper forms of his own design to notify the Department of 
Motor Vehicles about dispositions—even though the department did not 
accept the paper forms he had been filing since 1991.65 
III.    OTHER REASONS WHY JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 
IS NECESSARY 
A. Holding Lawyers, Court Staff, and Jurors Accountable 
One key reason for requiring judges to be conversant in relevant 
technology has less to do with the judges themselves than with those 
appearing in their courtrooms, such as lawyers, courtroom staff, and even 
jurors.  Maintaining courtroom decorum and protecting the integrity of the 
justice system is part of the judicial role.66  And while judges necessarily 
 
61. Dan M. Clark, Western NY Judge Resigns Over Administrative, Tech Failures After 28 Years on 




63. News Release, N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, Town Court Justice in Chautauqua 




65. Clark, supra note 61. 
66. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1, r. 2.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
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depend upon counsel appearing before them to help achieve these goals by 
reminding litigants and witnesses to adhere to the court’s instructions, the 
fact remains that technology misuse can threaten the integrity of the system.  
From jurors tweeting or commenting online about the cases before them—
such as “researching” the parties and issues online67—to lawyers failing to 
uphold their duty of candor to the tribunal,68 the sanctity of the trial process 
can be undermined by the online misconduct of those participating in the 
process.  Judges must not only be aware of the potential for such 
misbehavior by those in their courtrooms; they should also have at least a 
basic grasp of the technology that could enable such undermining of the 
court’s authority. 
Take, for example, a lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal.69  While 
there have been several anecdotal examples of lawyers who have obtained a 
continuance from a judge only to later face a reckoning when their Facebook 
activities betray the false grounds for delays, the simple fact is that using 
technological means to verify a lawyer’s story can help a judge.70  For 
example, in 2018 a Texas lawyer received a probated suspension for 
testifying falsely in a probation review hearing.71  The attorney’s 
involvement in the proceeding began innocently enough: he took a friend 
out to a bar for drinks, and memorialized their night out celebrating with 
photos on Facebook.72  Unfortunately, the friend in question was on 
probation and barred from drinking alcohol, frequenting establishments 
serving alcohol, or violating a curfew.73  The lawyer testified at the 
probation hearing that the friend was not with him, only to have his lack of 
 
67. See Michael R. Sisak, Weinstein Lawyers: ‘Circus’ Atmosphere, Juror Tweets Unfair, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, (Jan. 15, 2020, 7:52 AM), https://apnews.com/3828f1b0f398724cd7cee3b543185366 [https:// 
perma.cc/TC53-V8N8] (“As if picking a jury for Harvey Weinstein’s rape trial wasn’t complicated 
enough, some potential jurors have been posting on social media about their involvement in the case, 
violating court rules that could land them behind bars . . . .”). 
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
69. Id. r. 3.03. 
70. See Charles Toutant, Late-Filing Lawyer’s Excuse Undone by Vacation Photos on Instagram, 
N.J. L.J. (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/04/27/late-filing-
lawyers-excuse-undone-by-vacation-photos-on-instagram/?slreturn=20200023015227 [https:// 
perma.cc/UYB3-5K6B] (sanctioning attorney who falsified justification for requesting extension after 
missing a filing deadline). 
71. Comm’n for Law. Discipline v. Giovannini, File No. 201705757 (State Bar of Tex. Evid. 
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candor revealed when the probation officer brought the Facebook posts (as 
well as surveillance video from the bar) to the court’s attention.74 
An even more egregious example is New York lawyer, Lina Franco.  
Franco, a labor and employment solo practitioner, was representing a group 
of restaurant workers in a wage-and-hour violation case, Ha v. Baumgart 
Café.75  Having missed a filing deadline pursuant to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, Franco filed a request for an extension of time sixteen days 
after the fact.76  As good cause for the extension, Franco represented to the 
court that she had missed her deadline due to a family emergency in 
Mexico City, attaching what appeared to be a travel website itinerary 
showing her flights to and from New York and Mexico City.77 
Unfortunately for Franco, her opposing counsel owned a calendar and 
was social media savvy.78  Defense attorney Benjamin Xue responded with 
exhibits of screenshots from Franco’s Instagram account during the period 
of time she was supposedly in Mexico City caring for her ailing mother, 
which showed Franco enjoying a Thanksgiving dinner in New York, visiting 
a bar in Miami, attending an art exhibit in Miami, and sitting poolside in 
Miami (note: enjoying a poolside margarita does not count as “visiting 
Mexico”).79 
Caught red-handed, Franco admitted her lack of candor to the court, 
stated she was “not honest,” and claimed she had experienced so much 
emotional distress from caring for her mother at an earlier juncture that it 
caused her to miss the filing deadline and provide the fake itinerary.80  
Further falling on her sword, Franco withdrew as counsel for the three 
restaurant worker plaintiffs.81  However, lawyers for the restaurant 
owners sought sanctions against Franco.  United States Magistrate 
Judge Michael A. Hammer agreed with the defense, finding that Franco had 
 
74. Id. 
75. Toutant, supra note 70. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See id. (“Her purported flight itinerary showed her taking a flight to Mexico City on 




81. Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to L. Civ. R. 102.1, Ha v. Baumgart 
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“deliberately misled the Court and the other attorneys in this case.”82  
Judge Hammer imposed sanctions of $10,000 against Franco.83 
Of course, it is not just lawyers’ use of technology that judges need to be 
aware of; courtroom staff’s misuse of social media platforms can also 
endanger public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the justice 
system.  Consider, for example, the case of April C. Shepard, a Kansan 
court reporter at the Wyandotte County District Court, who had previously 
served in the same capacity for the Shawnee County District Court.  In 
December 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court entered a public reprimand 
against Shepard for comments she had made on social media that the court 
and the Kansas State Board of Examiners of Court Reporters found had 
undermined public confidence in the “independence, integrity, and impartiality of 
the judiciary.”84 
In 2012, Shepard was the court reporter for a highly publicized murder 
trial, State v. Chandler.85  In late October 2017, while the case was on appeal, 
the Topeka Capitol Journal published an article that included a number of 
comments that Shepard made on Facebook concerning the trial: 
•  “Oh, stop.  Dana Chandler is not innocent.  She may get a new trial 
but the outcome will be the same.” 
•  “No one else would’ve done this but Dana Chandler.” 
•  “I’m confident they got the right perpetrator in this case.  Look,  
I was there, I reported that whole case.  I saw firsthand this case.   
I do agree, though, a lot of times they have prosecuted the wrong 
person and I believe those people should be exonerated however it 
happens.  This case however is very different.”86 
Chandler’s appeal was successful, and in April 2018, her conviction was 
overturned.87  Although Shepard acknowledged making the Facebook 
posts, she insisted that “she handled herself in an impartial and objective 
 
82. Toutant, supra note 70. 
83. A total of $44,283 in attorney’s fees were sought by the three defense firms, but 
Judge Hammer rejected the requests as “unreasonably high.”  Id. 
84. In re Shepard, 453 P.3d 288, 294 (Kan. 2019) (quoting KAN. S. CT. R. 441). 
85. State v. Chandler, 414 P.3d 713 (Kan. 2018).  The defendant, Dana Chandler, had been 
convicted of killing her ex-husband and his girlfriend.  Id. at 717–18. 
86. In re Shepard, 453 P.3d at 290. 
87. See Chandler, 414 P.3d at 716 (reversing Chandler’s murder convictions and remanding “this 
case to the district court for further proceedings”). 
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manner” during the trial.88  However, despite her claim that the online 
comments in question were made more than four years after the trial, she 
admitted that “in hindsight, perhaps that was not the appropriate thing to 
do.”89 
The Kansas Supreme Court ordered that Shepard receive a public 
reprimand, noting her status as an officer of the court and stating that 
“courts and officers of the court must maintain an image of fairness and 
impartiality in the administration of justice.”90  Going further, the court 
observed that 
Respondent knew the case she was discussing was on appeal because her 
Facebook comment acknowledged the possibility that the defendant may get 
a new trial but opined the defendant would be found guilty again.  This 
comment, along with her other comments that spanned almost a year and a 
half, completely ignores the presumption of innocence that defendant carries 
throughout a trial.  Respondent’s comments are concrete and classic examples 
of bias or prejudice against a party.91 
A judge who is tech competent will not only be aware of the potential for 
lawyers and staff to engage in online misconduct but will also be vigilant in 
detecting the disruptive effects of jurors who threaten the integrity of the 
justice system through various forms of online misconduct.  Such 
misconduct consists of jurors “researching” the parties and issues online 
and communicating with third parties—or even litigants themselves—via 
social media platforms.92  This is a persistent issue that has been the subject 
of considerable attention, including scholarly articles.93  It has also led to 
many jurisdictions revising or updating their jury instructions and 
admonishments to address this threat from inside the jury box.94 
It is sufficient to note that it is important in this Digital Age for a judge 
to be aware of how damaging jurors’ online activities can be to the integrity 
 
88. In re Shepard, 453 P.3d at 290. 
89. Id. at 291. 
90. Id. at 293. 
91. Id. at 294. 
92. See Sisak, supra note 67 (discussing a judge’s warnings to jurors involving the use of social 
media and its potentially prejudicial affects). 
93. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 9, at 183 (addressing issues involving tech competence and 
ethics within the judiciary and legal profession). 
94. See Amy J. St. Eve et al., More From the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. 64, 86–89 (2014) (“[T]he best way to ensure an impartial jury in the age of social 
media is through carefully crafted jury instructions.”). 
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of judicial proceedings and the presumption of those proceedings’ fairness 
and impartiality.  To illustrate how this continues to be a concern, one need 
look no further than the most recent high-profile trial in the media’s glare: 
the sexual assault trial in New York of former movie mogul 
Harvey Weinstein.95  As jury selection got underway, presiding 
Judge James Burke commented about the tendency of prospective jurors to 
venture onto social media despite the court’s warnings: “The court was 
alerted recently that a few prospective jurors from last week went on 
Facebook and Twitter as if I hadn’t just said not to, what was it, a hundred 
times?  A thousand times?  Was anything I said ambiguous?”96 
Among the potential jurors who had been dismissed, was a man who had 
“tweeted about leveraging ‘serving on the jury of a high-profile case’ to 
promote a novel” he had written.97  The would-be juror narrowly avoided 
jail time for violating Judge Burke’s orders not to tweet about the trial.98  As 
this latest case illustrates, part of a judge’s technological competence 
involves being aware of and proactive about the dangers of impermissible 
online activities by jurors. 
B. Cyberthreats: Courts Under Siege 
Yet, another reason for requiring some degree of tech competence on the 
part of judges is that the environment in which courts exist is one that is 
increasingly under attack from cyberthreats, such as ransomware attacks or 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.99  In December 2015, and 
again in June 2016, the Minnesota Judicial Branch suffered coupling 
cyberattacks, the second of which disrupted its website functionality for 
 
95. Sisak, supra note 67; see also J. Clara Chan, Prospective Harvey Weinstein Juror Who Tweeted About 
Trial Could Face Jail Time, WRAP (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.thewrap.com/harvey-
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repercussions faced by a juror whose use of social media violated a judge’s order). 
96. Sisak, supra note 67. 
97. Id. 
98. Elizabeth Wagmeister, Weinstein Judge Lectures Would-be Juror Over Bad Tweet, VARIETY 
(Mar. 10, 2020, 8:42 AM), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/harvey-weinstein-juror-howard-
mittelmark-tweet-court-judge-1203528690/ [https://perma.cc/L87F-PWM3].  
99. See Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Cyberattacks on Courts and Other Government Institutions, JUDGES’ J., 
Summer 2018, at 37, 38 (“[T]he purpose of [a DDoS attack] is to deny access to the website by 
legitimate users.”); Victoria Hudgins, When Local Courts Get Hit by Cyberattacks, Who’s Liable?, 
LEGALTECH NEWS (June 3, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2019/06/03/w
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GA8D-SYE6] (“The growing number of local governments targeted by cyberattacks highlights that 
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ten days.100  This “DDoS attack overwhelmed the Minnesota Judicial 
Branch’s website with network traffic that blocked out typical users.”101  In 
January 2014, cyberterrorists launched cyberattacks on the federal court 
system that led to a brief outage of some court websites as well as the 
PACER system.102  For hours, these attacks disrupted bankruptcy courts, 
district courts, and circuit appellate courts nationwide.  As one observer 
described the risks if such attacks had been successful: “Personal data of 
court patrons is at risk—compromising their identities and inviting fraud.  
Intrusion into the court systems could sabotage the workings of the 
judiciary—even introduce subversive information that could throw the 
outcome of a case.”103 
Cyberattacks have unfortunately become a part of the new reality that 
courts have to cope with in the Digital Age.  In March 2018, the municipal 
courts of the City of Atlanta were hit with a ransomware attack that 
rendered its systems unable to process ticket payments or validate 
outstanding warrants.104  In May 2019, “the First Judicial District of 
Pennsylvania shut down Philadelphia’s court website, including its docket 
tracking and litigation filing features,” due to a “virus intrusion” found on 
court computers.105  In late April 2019, Potter County, Texas, was 
victimized by a ransomware attack that shut down its entire network of 
550 computers and reduced all of its court employees to the use of pencils 
and paper.106  That event pales in comparison to the coordinated 
ransomware attack in August 2019 that struck at least twenty-three small 
Texas cities, paralyzing the computer systems of police, courts, and other 
entities.107 
Since courts, like most governmental entities, usually possess sensitive 
information concerning both individuals and companies, they are a tempting 
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target for cyberattacks, regardless of whether the motive is ransom, theft of 
data, or simply disruption.108  An increasing number of courts are realizing 
the growing necessity to educate court personnel on how to prevent or 
mitigate the risks of cyberattacks, just as more courts are formulating 
response plans in the event of such attacks.109  Because the greatest areas 
of vulnerability for any institution is its human personnel, who can fall prey 
to phishing emails and other means for bad actors to gain access, it is vital 
that judges appreciate the risk of cyberattacks.  It is essential for judges and 
other individuals to practice good digital hygiene.  And in an environment 
in which court systems find themselves in the crosshairs of cyberterrorists, 
the stakes are much higher than the fleeting embarrassment of an 
inadvertent “reply all” email or other electronic misstep. 
C. Technology In, and Before, the Courts 
Perhaps the most obvious reason for requiring judges to be tech 
competent is the fact that, as society has become more 
technologically-obsessed, more of the disputes making their way to the 
judicial arena involve technology issues or the presentation of evidence from 
less traditional sources.110  And in the era of e-discovery, digital filing, 
lawyers presenting their cases using tablets or laptops, and a dizzying array 
of trial presentation software, the very nature of how a case is initiated, 
worked up, and put before a judge and jury has fundamentally changed.  We 
live and practice in a world where the evidence may come from a tweet or 
Facebook post; the emoji in an email or text may be subject to different 
interpretations with varying legal significance; digital evidence from a Fitbit 
or Amazon Echo could alter the course of a case; and a judge’s 
decision-making on everything from bail consideration to sentencing or 
probation guidelines may be impacted by an algorithm.111  At least one 
writer (herself a former federal judge) has written about the potential for 
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artificial intelligence holographic judges to shoulder some of a court’s 
caseload.112 
A related issue concerns not just how evidence comes before a judge in 
the twenty-first century, but the substance of the disputes themselves 
becoming more technology-oriented.113  Some legal scholars have noted 
the need for judges who are more conversant in technology, since 
“[r]esolution of scientific and technological controversies occupies an 
increasingly important position in the agenda of the federal courts.”114  
Technology writers and legal scholars alike have never been shy about 
criticizing courts that “get it wrong” about the technological issues that 
come before them.  One prime example is the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals sentencing Eric Lundgren to fifteen months in prison and 
fining him $500,000 for “counterfeiting” software recovery disks that 
Microsoft gives away for free, a result that one writer said betrayed the 
judge’s “near total ignorance of technology.”115  Some observers, however, 
point to the fact that “judges everywhere rely on lawyers to explain the 
nuances of the cases before them,” and that cases involving technology are 
no different—therefore, the stereotype of the Luddite judge is just that, a 
stereotype.116 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
Justices on the United States Supreme Court have, on multiple occasions, 
prompted chuckles during oral argument at their lack of understanding  
of everyday technology “such as email, pagers, cloud storage, social media,” 
and streaming services like Netflix (or, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor  
described it, “Netflick”).117  However, in cases like South Dakota v. Wayfair  
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Inc.118 or Carpenter v. United States,119 the Court recognized that digital 
technologies have irrevocably altered relationships between the government 
and the governed, and so adjusted constitutional jurisprudence 
accordingly.120  Few observers would demand that judges follow in  
the footsteps of United States District Judge William H. Alsup of the 
Northern District of California, a longtime coder who taught himself Java 
in order to better grasp some of the technology at issue in the landmark 
Oracle v. Google litigation.121 
However, at the same time, our system cannot afford Luddite judges 
either, and requiring some basic degree of tech competence on the part of 
judges (akin to what is already required of lawyers in most jurisdictions) is 
hardly an outrageous or burdensome proposal.  Not only is tech competence 
needed to simply remain conversant in overseeing the daily operations of a 
court, but issues like e-discovery, data privacy, and the admissibility of digital 
evidence also permeate many of the matters that come before the courts.  
The world in which judges exercise their responsibilities is no longer  
just a physical, but a digital one as well.  Judges would be wise to be  
mindful of the observations made by New York Supreme Court 
Judge Matthew F. Cooper when authorizing service of process via  
social media in his 2015 opinion in the Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku122 case: 
[A] concept should not be rejected simply because it is novel or nontraditional.  
This is especially so where technology and the law intersect.  In this age of 
technological enlightenment, what is for the moment unorthodox and unusual 
stands a good chance of sooner or later being accepted and standard, or even 
outdated and passé.  And because legislatures have often been slow to react 
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to these changes, it has fallen on courts to insure that our legal procedures 
keep pace with current technology.123 
  
 
123. Id. at 713–14 (citing New England Merchs. Nat. Bank v. Iran Power Generation & 
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
